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Casenotes and Comments
ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTS OF CORPORATIONS
IN MARYLAND
The Western Maryland Ry. Co., chartered to construct
and operate a railroad, made a contract with the Blue
Ridge Hotel Co. by which, in consideration of the enlarge-
ment of a summer hotel at a point on the line of the road,
it was agreed that if in any one year, the net earnings of
the Hotel Co. should not suffice to pay a 5% dividend on
its capital stock, and interest on its first mortgage bonds,
then the Railroad Co. would pay to the Hotel Co. for its
stock and bondholders, such commissions upon its receipts
from traffic to and from two stations near the hotel as
would be sufficient to make up the deficit. For some years
the Railroad Co. made up the deficiency and upon its re-
fusal to make further payments for this purpose, this ac-
tion was brought on the contract to recover the amount of
one year's deficit. The defendant, among other pleas, in-
terposed the defense of ultra vires. A demurrer to this
plea was sustained and issue was then joined on the de-
fendant's other pleas. There was a judgment for the
plaintiff for a stated amount. The defendant appealed
on the ground that a promisor corporation cannot be held
on an ultra vires contract on an action by the promisee.
The trial court was reversed. It was held that such an
ultra vires act was void because the Railroad Co. had no
power under its charter to guarantee the payment of in-
terest and dividends by a Hotel Co., and consequently no
action would lie against the Railroad Co. on the contract.
The performance of the contract by the Hotel Co. was
held not to estop the Railroad Co. to set up the defense of
ultra vires.1
Thus is presented the most recent pronouncement of
the Court of Appeals of Maryland on the subject of partly
executed ultra vires contracts of corporations. Ultra vires
contracts-those contracts in contravention of the State-
imposed restriction on corporate activity-have long pre-
sented a vexing problem, both to the courts and to attor-
neys. The magnitude of the problem is enhanced by the
variegated results reached in the disposition of the cases,
and while it is true that the problem will arise in the future
I Western Md. R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Co., 102 Ald. 307, 62 AtI. 351 (1905).
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less frequently due to the almost blanket power now granted
corporations, it is still a most pertinent problem for cor-
porations doing business under charters granted years ago.
The result reached in the principal case is not the first
pronouncement on the subject. It had come before the
Court of Appeals many times in the previous century. The
first case reported in which the subject of ultra vires con-
tracts was discussed and a conclusion reached as to the
effects of such contracts was that of Steam Navigation Co.
v. Dandridge.2 In that cast a contract was entered into
between the defendant corporation and the plaintiff, where-
by the defendant undertook to break a passage and tow
a certain schooner out of the ice-locked harbor of Balti-
more City. The plaintiff's boat was lost and he brought
an action in assumpsit (special action of trespass on the
case)3 to recover for the goods lost. The defendant com-
pany pleaded non-assumpsit and at the conclusion of the
case offered a prayer to the effect that the contract to take
the boat out of the harbor was an ultra vires contract
and hence no recovery could be had thereon. This prayer
was rejected and on appeal it was held that the rejection
was error. The Court stated: "To the doctrine of estoppel
applied to such cases we cannot yield our assent. If the
corporation is estopped from denying its power, the es-
toppel operates with like effect upon those who contract
with them, and the result would be that no matter how lim-
ited the design and powers of a corporation may appear
in its charter, practically it is a corporation without limi-
tation as to its powers. Such a doctrine at this day is dan-
gerous to the community, and is at war with the modern
decisions upon the subject. '"4 This case shows the then
unequivocal position of the Maryland Court, and it is in-
teresting to note the subsequent ramifications of, and ap-
pendages to, the principle of law enunciated in this early
case.
The next case in which the subject of ultra vires con-
tracts of corporations was raised was Abbot v. Balto. &
Rapp. Steam Packet Co.' This was a case in equity and the
petitioner put in a claim for a certain amount contending
that it was due him by virtue of an agreement with the
'8 G. & J. 248 (186).
' Chitty on Pleadings, Ch. 2, p. 144. It is interesting to note that this
contract case was taken as authority for refusing to allow recovery for an
ultra vires tort in the later case of Weckler v. First National Bank, 42 Md.
581 (1875).
'Steam Nay. Co. v. Dandridge, 8 G. & J. 248, 319 (1836).
1 Md. Ch. 542 (1850).
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corporation then in receivership. The agreement concerned
the deepening of a part of the Rappahanock River, up-
stream from the Virginia terminus, over which the corpo-
ration was not authorized to operate. The claim was de-
fended on the ground that it arose out of an ultra vires
contract and this defense proved successful. In the rejec-
tion of the claim the Court used language which was very
sweeping in its scope. In effect it said that the contract
entered into was beyond the powers of the corporation and
corporations are incapable of making contracts which are
in contravention of their charters. By its language the
Court negatived any effect which might be given to such
a contract, and treated the contract as creating no rights
and imposing no liabilities.
Next in line (chronologically) is the case of Albert and
wife v. Savings Bank.' There a cestui que trust sought to
avoid an hypothecation to a bank, by one of its directors,
of stock which he held as a trustee, which hypothecation
was intended to secure a loan made to him by the bank.
As a basis for his suit, the plaintiff argued that the bank
had no authority by its charter to loan money to its di-
rectors, and, being thus prohibited, it could not hold the
stock to the injury of the plaintiff. In upholding the plain-
tiff's argument, the Court said, ". .. a corporation has no
power to do what it is inhibited by its charter from doing,
and if, in violation of it, injury should be done to the prop-
erty of a third party, it is liable". 7 Since the bank ob-
tained no title to the stock it was required to return it and
all dividends accruing thereon from the date of the hypothe-
cation. In the disposition of the case, the Court said by
way of dictum: "It is true, Jones (the trustee) might be
estopped from denying the legality of the transaction, ... "8
The next case in which the Court dealt with the conse-
quences of an ultra vires corporate contract was that of
Maryland Hospital v. Foreman.' There the Maryland Hos-
pital agreed with Foreman, in consideration of a lump pay-
ment of $1,200, to support his sister, then a lunatic patient
in the institution, for the remainder of her life. The Hos-
pital had no power under its charter to make such a con-
tract. After the girl died and the contract had thus been
fully executed, Foreman sued the Hospital to recover the
sum he paid, less the necessary expenses incurred in the
-2 Md. 159 (1852).
7 Ibid., 173.
8 Ibid., 172.
'29 Md. 524 (1868).
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support of his sister until the time of her death. The Court
held that the contract was neither malum in se nor malum
prohibitum so that the parties could not be said to stand
in part delicto, and in allowing Foreman to recover said,
"... . if a party makes a contract with a corporation which
is simply beyond the powers of the latter, he may recover
back the money paid thereon, whether the contract be exe-
cuted or executory." 1" It is interesting to compare the re-
sult reached in this case with that reached in the later case
of Montrose Building Ass'n v. Page, Receiver," in which,
apparently, a contrary conclusion was reached. In the case
following the Hospital case the Court of Appeals, without
need for doing so, discussed the topic of ultra vires con-
tracts. This was Boyce v. M. B. Church,'12 in which it was
said: "It has been determined by this Court, that a corpo-
ration cannot bind itself in excess of its powers. "13
Following this rather brief announcement, the subject
again arose in its fullest aspects in the case of Lazear v.
National Union Bank." There the plaintiff bank discounted
several notes negotiated by the firm of Lazear Brothers.
One of the notes discounted was drawn by the firm but
was negotiated to the bank by a firm of note brokers. It
further appeared that a written guaranty had been executed
by the individual defendant to the bank, such guaranty
guaranteeing all liabilities incurred by the bank in the dis-
counting of the notes. Suit was brought by the bank and,
among other defenses, the defendant contended that the note
taken from the note brokers was taken by purchase and
not by discount, and hence was a transaction beyond the
charter powers of the bank. After a judgment for the bank,
there was an appeal and the Court found error in the rul-
ings of the lower court. It was held that the contention of
the defendant, as to the note taken from the note brokers,
was correct, that there was a purchase, and that the bank,
being a national bank, could not purchase negotiable paper,
but could only discount it. It was held, therefore, that the
bank could not acquire any title to the note, and that if
any recovery could be obtained by the bank, such recovery
could not include the amount of the note taken from the
note brokers. There was a dissent on the ground that the
purchase of the note was not ultra vires but it is interest-
ing to notice that there was no dissent on the effect of
10 Ibid., 532.
11143 Md. 631, 123 At. 68 (192 3).
"246 Md. 359 (1877).
1s Ibid., 373.
1452 Md. 78 (1879).
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holding the purchase beyond the power of the bank. The
case was then re-argued, but there was no change in the
decision.
Two years later, the Court again talked of ultra vires
transactions. The case was that of Booth v. Robinson,",
and in a statement not necessary at all for the disposition
of the case, the Court spoke in a manner foreign to what
had been regarded as the settled rule in the State. The
Court, after holding a transaction to be intra vires, pointed
out that where parties complaining have received the con-
sideration of the contract, ultra vires in character but in
other respects just and equitable, there is no principle
upon which a court of equity could be induced to interfere
upon the mere ground of want of authority in the adverse
party.
Such was the state of the Maryland authorities when
the next case came before the Court. It is to be noted that
in all the cases, where a square decision on the effect of
an ultra vires contract was necessary, the Court adhered
to the view announced in the Dandridge case,' 6 although
there were dicta seemingly contra. In the case of United
German Bank v. Katz" an apparently new theory was acted
upon and a result was reached which seems at variance
with what had been previously considered a closed ques-
tion. There the plaintiff bank was incorporated as a Sav-
ings Institution under statutory sanction. One of the pro-
visions in the statute was that no corporation not expressly
authorized, could by any implication be considered as au-
thorized to conduct banking privileges. Notwithstanding
its lack of power, the plaintiff bank discounted a promis-
sory note which the defendant had executed, and upon suit
brought to recover the proceeds, the defendant interposed
the defense of ultra vires. The Court of Appeals reversed
the action of the lower court sustaining this plea. The prin-
ciple was formulated that it would be inequitable to per-
mit one who has received the proceeds and the benefit of
the transaction or who knowingly procured them for some
one else to repudiate it on the ground that the corpora-
tion with which he dealt had no power to make the con-
tract. The Court distinguished this case from Lazear's
case,' s8 and although there was a dissent and a re-argument,
the decision stood.
1855 Md. 419 (1881).10 Steam Nay. Co. v. Dandridge, 8 G. & J. 248 (1836).
1757 Md. 128 (1881).
1 Lazear v. Nat. Union Bank, 52 Md. 78 (1879).
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Ultra vires contracts were again considered by the
Court of Appeals in the case of German Aged People's
Home v. Hammerbacker et at."5 The facts in the case are
immaterial, as the case was important only for its dictum.
After holding the transaction to be neither ultra vires nor
against public policy, (the defense of ultra vires having
been raised by an individual defendant) the Court said
that if it were in error in holding thus, under the deci-
sion in the Katz case, 0 the defendant would be estopped
from setting up such a defense.
The next case, Heironimus v. Sweeney,"' presented a
square decision on the effect of an ultra vires transaction.
There a savings institution borrowed money from indi-
viduals under the guise of acceptance of deposits. There
were other depositors, but since they were entitled to vote
for the control of the institution, they held the legal status
of stockholders. In a contest in equity for priority upon
the insolvency of the Institution, the receiver of the same
contended that the borrowing of the money was beyond
its powers. The Court, though not stating definitely that
the transaction was or was not ultra vires in its nature,
nevertheless allowed priority to the non-stockholding de-
positors, as creditors, and, citing with approval the Katz
case22 and the Hammerbacker case,21 used this language:
"It is inequitable to permit one who had obtained the pro-
ceeds and the benefit of the contract, to repudiate it on the
ground that the corporation from which he has obtained
the benefit had no power to make the contract. ' ' 2 '  The
Court also cited with approval the language of the Fore-
man case" in which it was said: "If a party makes a con-
tract with a corporation which is simply beyond the pow-
ers of the latter, he may recover back the money paid
thereon whether the contract be executed or executory." 26
It is worthy of note that while the application of the prin-
ciple enunciated by either of these two prior cases is equally
productive of the result here reached, yet the Court in ap-
plying them both is reaching that result by the utilization
of contradictory concepts. It is submitted that the Court
1- 64 Md. 595, 3 Atl. 678 (1886).
20 United German Bank v. Katz, 57 Md. 128 (1881).
21 83 Md. 146, 34 Atl. 823 (1896).
22 United German Bank v. Katz, 57 Md. 128 (1881).
28 German Aged People's Home v. Hammerbacker, 64 Md. 595, 3 Atl. 678
(1886).2
, Heironimus v. Sweeney, 83 Md. 146, 159, 34 Atl. 823 (1896).
11 Maryland Hospital v. Foreman, 29 Md. 524 (1868).
20 Ibid., 29 Md. 532.
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erred in thus culling from and combining the language of
these two judicially convenient cases. The Katz case 27 en-
forced a contract notwithstanding its ultra vires nature,
while the Foreman case 28 rescinded the contract and al-
lowed recovery because of its ultra vires character. In the
one case, recovery was allowed because of voidness; in the
other, in spite of it.
Ultra vires was again urged as a bar to recovery in a
suit by a bank on a note in the case of Black v. Bank of
Westminster.29 The Court held that there was no evidence
of an ultra vires transaction, but in so doing, made the
statement: "Being thus an executed contract, even if the
transaction were a sale and not a discount, recovery could
be had under the Katz case, which was held not to be in
conffict with Lazear's case."' 30
It was at this point in the chronological order of the de-
cisions on this question, and with a seeming contrariety
of precedents to guide the Court, that the principal case
was decided. Another case, decided in the same year was
that of Md. Trust Co. v. Mechanics Bank.31 There the pe-
titioning bank sought to have a sum of money paid to it
out of the assets of the defunct trust company. The re-
ceiver of the trust company, in defending the claim, con-
tended that the sum demanded by the petitioner accrued,
if at all, by reason of an illegal contract. The Court in up-
holding this contention, discussed the distinction between
illegal and ultra vires contracts. In speaking of ultra vires
contracts, the Court said, "The discussion will be shortened
by putting aside the mere ultra vires character of the con-
tract, because a contract ultra vires is not necessarily un-
enforceable-it may be enforced under certain conditions
-and, hence, before it can be stricken down on that ground
alone, all the conditions under which it may be upheld must
be eliminated .... 2
The latest case in Maryland concerning such dealings
was the case of Montrose Building Ass'n. v. Page. 3 There
the association purchased stock in a bank in excess of the
amount subscribed for by the association's free sharehold-
ers. The purchase of the stock was effected through the
negotiation of loans from the bank issuing the stock and as
27 United German Bank v. Katz, 57 Md. 128 (1881).
"Maryland Hospital v. Foreman, 29 Md. 524 (1868).
29 96 Md. 399, 54 Atl. 88 (1903).
30 Ibid., 96 Md. 430.
"2 102 Md. 608, 63 Ati. 70 (1906).
-1 Ibid., 102 Md. 615.
83 143 Md. 631, 123 Atl. 68 (1923).
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security for which the association hypothecated certain
mortgages. Upon the receivership of the bank, the associa-
tion presented a petition asking that it be deemed a gen-
eral creditor of the bank to the extent of the stock held by
the association, on the ground that the purchase of the
stock was beyond its charter powers. In refusing the as-
sociation this status, the Court, quoting from Corpus Juris,
said, ". . . The executed dealings of a corporation must
be allowed to stand for and against both parties, where
the plainest rules of good faith require it. "4 It further
stated that "While it is clear that the capital of the build-
ing association was diverted from the objects contemplated
by its charter and chartered purpose, yet, the transaction
in controversy having been completely executed on both
sides, the contract will not be disturbed."" Here the Court
was unquestionably dealing with a completely executed con-
tract, a situation which had arisen in the Foreman case.3
It may be remarked in passing that in a number of the
other cases dealing with ultra vires contracts the Court
has used language in respect to executed contracts which
is rather confusing. To use the words of the Court in the
Black case, 7 "Being thus an executed contract.., recovery
could be had .... ,,3s It is submitted that the Court failed
to distinguish properly between executory, partly executed,
and completely executed contracts. The appellation "ex-
ecuted" attached to the transaction in the last mentioned
case creates the impression that the contract was com-
pletely executed, when in reality it was only partly exe-
cuted, owing to the fact that payment had yet to be made
on the note. Apparently the loose terminology used by the
Court can be traced to the Katz case"9 where the contract
was similarly alluded to as executed, when as a matter
of fact that case is open to the same criticism. Thus may
be seen the facts and decisions of the principal Maryland
cases. Whether or not these decisions are in conflict or
reconcilable, whether or not Maryland is included in the
majority of courts in the ultimate effect given to such trans-
-I Ibid., 143 Md. 636; 14-A C. J., See. 2168.
35 Ibid., 143 Md. 635.
"Maryland Hospital v. Foreman, 29 Md. 524 (1868).
"Black v. Bank of Westminster, 96 Md. 399, 54 Atl. 88 (1903).
"Ibid., 96 Md. 430.
Uo nited German Bank v. Katz, 57 Md. 128 (1881). "In considering the
contracts called executed contracts, it is necessary always to keep In mind
that executed contracts are those which have been fully performed on
both sides, although the Courts sometimes erroneously refer to contracts
executed on one side only as executed contracts." Fletcher on Corpora-
tions, Vol. 3, Ch. 37, Sec. 1559, p. 2631.
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actions, and what fundamental rule, if any, is followed in
this State, are the questions under consideration in this
comment.
Perhaps no phase of corporation law is attended with
so many and such widespread inconsistencies as that of
partly executed ultra vires contracts. ° The nature of ultra
vires contracts is such that their existence admits of such
inconsistencies. For these contracts, as their designation
implies, are, broadly stated, contracts contrary to the ex-
press or implied restriction imposed by the State in the
granting of the corporate charter, 1 and the meaning and
effect of such contracts is ultimately determined in accord-
ance with the varied and deep-rooted judicial and legisla-
tive policies of the States in their dealings with corporate
activity. Before entering into any considerations of policy
underlying the results, it would be well to point out that
there are three types of ultra vires contracts with which
courts have been called upon to deal. There are first such
contracts as are wholly executory in their nature. Now
it is held with a practical unanimity of opinion that the
execution of such contracts may be restrained at the in-
stance of a stockholder of the corporation." Secondly,
there are such contracts as are completely executed and
it is likewise held, with little dissent, that such transactions,
being completely closed, cannot be looked into and re-
scinded by the Court at the instance of either party to the
contract.' Where the conflict arises in its greatest aspects
are in those cases where one of the parties to the contract
has fully performed and the other party has not, and suit
is brought by the party performing. Will the Court proceed
indirectly to validate the contract by allowing suit thereon
and not take into consideration the ultra vires nature of
the contract, or will it fail to give it any effect whatsoever?
It would appear that in dealing with these situations, there
are two considerations of policy actuating the courts: One,
narrow and strict, illustrated by the stringent enforcement
of restricted corporate activity; the other, broad and equit-
able, appearing in the mild, and even at times, negative
+O Ballantine on Corporations, Ch. VII, p. 234.
41 Ibid., 235.
42 Stevens on Corporations, Ch. 8, pp. 272, 274; Hotchkin v. Third Nat.
Bank of Syracuse, 219 Mass. 234, 106 N. E. 974 (1914); Jemlson v. Citi-
zens' Sav. Bank of Jefferson, 122 N. Y. 135, 25 N. E. 264 (1890) ; 7 R. C. L.,
Sec. 678; Fletcher on Corporations, Vol. 3, Ch. 37, Sec. 1526, p. 2587.
11 Fletcher on Corporations, Vol. 3, Ch. 37, See. 1559; First Nat'l. Bank
of Xenia v. Stewart, 107 U. S. 676, 27 L. Ed. 592, 2 S. Ct. 778 (1882) ; Holmes
& Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Holmes & Wessell Metal Co., 127 N. Y. 252, 27 N. E. 831
(1891) ; Montrose Bldg. Ass'n. v. Page, 143 Md. 6'31, 123 Atl. 68 (1923).
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enforcement. Under this generalization, it follows that the
jurisdictions adhering to the policy of strict enforcement,
carry it into effect through the invalidation of all forms of
corporate activity in contravention of State-granted char-
ter powers. Such invalidation, under this policy, does not
include the notion of illegality, although it has been stated
that the whole undertaking is illegal.4 Invalidation is
taken to mean the non-enforceability of the contract, either
by the corporation or by the party with whom it deals,
whether occupying the position of plaintiff or defendant
while urging the ultra vires nature of the transaction. 5
The courts taking this position justify it on one or more
of several grounds. One basis, rather sparingly used, is
that of constructive notice-one dealing with a corporation
is bound to take notice of the extent of the limitations on
its powers. 46  Another basis is that the interest of stock-
holders of corporations demands that corporate funds be
utilized for purposes appropriate or incident to the exercise
of legitimate corporate power.47 Still another ground is
that the interest of the public must be subserved, it being
considered against public policy to allow a corporation
chartered for a specific purpose or purposes, to transcend
the powers conferred upon it by law.A A last reason some-
times advanced, and one embodying the major logic of
the strict view, is that the corporation, being a creature of
the State, has only those powers conferred upon it by the
Legislature, and consequently, having no power to enter
into ultra vires contracts, cannot be bound by them.48
1" Bissil v. Mich. So. & No. Ind. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258 (1860) ; Ashwana-
der v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U. S. 288, 80 L. Ed. 688, 56 S. Ct. 466
(1936).
" .. the fact that the contract has been executed by one of the par-
ties, and the other has thus received the consideration for his or its prom-
ise, cannot give the contract any validity; .. . such performance by one
of the parties, and receipt of the consideration by the other, does not estop
the latter from setting up that the contract is ultra vires, . . ." Fletcher
on Corporations, Vol. 3, Sec. 1539, pp. 2600, 2601.
" Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 35 L.
Ed. 55, 11 S. Ct. Rep. 478 (1890).
"McCormick v. Market Bank, 165 U. S. 538, 41 L. Ed. 817, 17 S. Ct.
Rep. 433 (1896).
"A See Brune, Maryland Corporation Law, 39, Sec. 33, where Mr. Brune
suggests a distinction between public service corporations, including banks
and railroads, on the one hand, and ordinary business corporations on the
other. He suggests that in the case of the former corporations the inter-
est of the State is paramount and that private estoppel should not suffice
to defeat the application of the doctrine of ultra vires.
" Straus & Brother v. Eagle Ins. Co. of Cincinnati, 5 Ohio St. 60 (1855);
Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 127, 2 L. Ed. 229 (1804); United
States Bank v. Dandrige, 12 Wheat. 64, 6 L. Ed. 552 (1827).
154
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In the division of authority the courts following this
strict view constitute quite a substantial minority. The
highest Court of England, 9 the Supreme Court of the
United States,"° and the highest courts of several of the
States,5' apparently have aligned themselves with this doc-
trine. It is to be noted, however, that adherence to the
strict view does not usually preclude recovery on a quan-
tum meruit basis, for the reasonable value of performance
rendered under an ultra vires contract.52
On the other hand, the jurisdictions which follow the
broader estoppel view reach their conclusions, not through
the actual validation of such contracts, but on the broad
equitable principle that one who has received the benefits
of the transaction, cannot be heard to disaffirm his capacity
to contract when the interposition of such a stand would
cause injustice to the other party. This pseudo-validation
enures to the advantage of both parties to the contract.
The courts which act under the settled policies base their
result on the ground, first that the public is adequately pro-
tected in that the State may forfeit the charter of the of-
fending corporation at any time. Secondly it is argued
that ultra vires, not being a meritorious defense, should
never operate to work injustice and hardship. In these jur-
isdictions suit is allowed on the contract in order to counter-
balance the potential hardship arising from the negation
of any rights accruing under the contract. The foundation
of this rule is justice, and if it is to be paramount, effect
can only be given it through the apparent validation of
the contract.58 This view may be considered to be the pre-
vailing view in this country.5 '
There is yet the old common law rule which gives full
force and effect to such contracts, not on the ground of
49 Ashbury Ry. Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653 (1875).50 Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 35 L.
Ed. 55, 11 S. Ct. Rep. 478 (1890).51 Fletcher on Corporations, Vol. 3, p. 2601, n. 84. Although it is open
to question whether Ohio, which Fletcher places with these states, can be
included as adhering to this view in the face of a recently enacted Cor-
poration Act. Cf. (1930) 4 Cinn. L. Rev. 419.
52 Citizen's National Bank v. Appleton, 216 U. S. 196, 54 L. Ed. 443,
30 S. Ct. 364 (1909) ; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. Co., 139
U. S. 62, 35 L. Ed. 69, 11 S. Ct. Rep. 489 (1890) ; West. Md. R. Co. v. Blue
Ridge Co., 102 Md. 307, 62 At. 351 (1905).
51 Bath Gaslight Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24, 45 N. E. 390 (1896); Du-
luth, S. S. & A. By. Co. v. Wilson, 200 Mich. 313, 167 N. W. 55 (1918) ; City
of Williston v. Ludowese, 53 N. D. 797, 208 N. W. 82 (1926) ; Lemmon v.
East Palestine Rubber Co., 260 Pa. 28, 103 Atl. 510 (1918) (dictum).
1, Stevens on Corporations, Ch. 8, p. 277; Fletcher on Corporations, Vol.
3, Ch. 37, p. 2610, n. 21; Ballantine on corporations, Ch. VII, Sec. 74, p.
259.
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justice or equity, but on the ground that since the State
has measured the powers of the corporation and has de-
fined the bounds within which it can legitimately operate,
any unauthorized extension by the corporation of the power
conferred is a matter solely between the corporation and
the State. The rule is interesting in that it was originally
in effect in England,55 and is the rule today in an almost
negligible number of States. 8
But the question of primary importance and interest
to the reader is the position of Maryland in so controver-
sial a situation. In some of the Maryland cases discussed
above, the Court of Appeals used language comparable to
that of courts in jurisdictions adhering to the strict view,
and in the decisions reached and the positive manner in
which the results were attained, one would have no hesi-
tancy in placing Maryland in this category. Yet in other
cases there is language employed and results reached which
seem definitely at variance with this view; the so-called
"equitable" doctrine which, from the early cases, seemed
to have no place in the policy of this State, attains a stat-
ure commensurate with that acquired by the strict view
(as a result of the Court's seeming adherence to such view
in the earlier cases). It is for this reason that the text writ-
ers and attorneys so often experience difficulty in ascer-
taining the true rule in effect in Maryland. It has been
stated57 that in Maryland there are some decisions in sup-
port of the estoppel view, but that the latest decision of
the Court, the Western Maryland case,"" "is in favor of
the Federal rule." The opinion has also been expressed
that "it is not possible to express concisely the law of this
State, because its decisions do not follow consistently either
of the two rules that have been discussed." '59 The same
British So. Africa Co. v. De Beers, (1910) 1 Ch. 354.
60 Harris v. Independence Gas Co., 76 Kan. 750, 92 Pac. 1123 (1907) ; City
Coal & Ice Co. v. Union Trust Co. of Maryland, 140 Va. 600, 125 S. E. 697
(1924); Zinc Carbonate Co. v. Shullsburg First Nat'l. Bank, 103 Wis.
125, 79 N. W. 229 (1889). It is open to question whether this view has
not also been followed In the case of Becker v. Kelsey, 157 Atl. 177, (N. J.
1931).
7 Fletcher on Corporations, Vol. 3, Ch. 37, p. 2605.
W8 est. Md. R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Co., 102 Md. 307, 62 AtI. 351 (1905).
69 France, Principles of Corporation Law, (1914) Sec. 76, p. 136. Mr.
Brune best states the true nature of the problem when he says, "In ap-
proaching the Maryland decisions the first point to be understood Is that
the language of the various opinions Is confusing and irreconcilable,
and the key to the problem lies in an analysis of the decisions themselves
rather than in the statement made by the court." Brune, Maryland Cor-
poration Law (1933), Ch. IV, p. 38. While the present writers agree with
Mr. Brune that the key to the problem lies In analysis of the decisions
rather than the language yet they are more inclined to feel that the lan-
guage itself Is reconcilable.
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author further states, "This case (Western Maryland case),
which cites with approval the principal Supreme Court
decisions, apparently settles the Maryland law in conform-
ity with the strict rule, namely, that an ultra vires contract,
being illegal, can never at any time or place or after any
degree of performance, be the basis of a recovery there-
on. ' W It is true that considered apart from the results
reached, the language of the cases is most confusing and
at times seemingly irreconcilable. Yet it is felt that the con-
fusion exists only in the quotation by the Court of Ap-
peals of language employed by various courts in their dis-
position of similar cases, and the adoption by the Court
of such apparently contradictory principles. There can be
shown by a close analysis of the Maryland decisions, with
reference to the facts presented, the conclusion reached,
and the language necessary to reach the result upon such
facts, an adherence to, rather than a departure from, a
static, fundamental principle.
That Maryland is consistent rather than contradictory
in the pursuance of its basic doctrine may best be shown
by a discussion of Lazear's case 6' and the Katz case 62 which
have frequently been considered at variance, although dis-
tinguished by the Court.63 In the latter case suit was brought
on a note discounted by the plaintiff bank which had no
power to do so. The party defendant was an accommoda-
tion endorser and it must be presumed that he did not actu-
ally benefit from the transaction. In the former case suit
was brought by the plaintiff bank on a written guaranty
executed by the defendant promising to reimburse the bank
for liabilities incurred through the discounting of commer-
cial paper negotiated by a certain firm. Several notes, the
basis of the suit, were introduced in evidence, one of them
having been executed by the firm and negotiated to the
bank through the medium of a firm of note brokers. The
defendant requested an instruction to the effect that re-
covery on the guaranty was restricted to the amount of
those notes taken by the bank on the faith of the guaranty,
and further, that the note taken from the note brokers was
a purchase and not a discount of the same, and hence ultra
vires the plaintiff bank and no recovery possible thereon.
The rejection of these two prayers was held to be error.
It is submitted that these two cases are not in conflict. If
6o France, Principles of Corporation Law, Sec. 76, p. 143, n. 1.
S1 Lazear v. Nat. Union Bank, 52 Md. 78 (1879).
s United German Bank v. Katz. 57 M~1. 128 (1881).
a Ibid., 142.
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an inference could be raised that the defendant in the Katz
case64 received the proceeds of the note then there is no
conflict for the reason that the benefit moved directly to
him from the bank, while in Lazear's case,65 no benefit
moved directly from the bank to the defendant guarantor,
and having received no benefit, there is no basis for estop-
ping him from pleading ultra vires. Estoppel more often
than not connotes the idea of benefit, and to estop one who
has received no benefit at all seems to stretch the rule to
a somewhat impractical, if not unjust, end. The Court in
the Katz case, 6 in distinguishing the cases, emphasizes the
notion of direct benefit as vital to the application of an es-
toppel. If the presumption is correct that the defendant
in the latter case did not receive the proceeds of the note,
there is yet no conflict, since in the latter case, the defend-
ant, being an endorser on the note, was in privity with the
bank in respect to the very contract in suit; in the former
case, there was privity of contract only on the extraneous
guaranty, and none on the note, the proceeds of which
never accrued to the benefit of the defendant and he was
not a party to the ultra vires transaction. Further, in the
latter case, the bank took the note on the faith of the de-
fendant's endorsement, while in the former case, it is not
known for a fact that the note was taken by the bank on
the strength of the guaranty executed by the defendant.
In declaring it error on the part of the lower court to have
rejected the instruction asked for by the defendant as to
the reliance by the bank on the guaranty, the Court im-
pliedly stated that even if the transaction were not a pur-
chase, but a discount, the element of reliance would still
have to be shown in order to warrant recovery. The dis-
sent in the Katz case67 dealt with the effect of absence of
power in the bank in the former case to take the note and
argued that a corresponding result should obtain in the
latter case. It is submitted that the dissent is in error since
it fails to take into consideration either the question of di-
rect benefit moving from the bank to the party seeking to
avoid the transaction 8 or the actual participation by the
party defendant in the ultra vires transaction.
" United German Bank v. Katz, 57 Md. 128 (1881).
05 Lazear v. Nat. Union Bank, 52 Md. 78 (1879).
" United German Bank v. Katz, 57 Md. 128 (1881).
07 Ibid., 149.
11 Ibid., 144. The same dissenting Judge appears to have fallen fur-
ther into error when he states, ". . . it was plainly decided In that case,
(Lazear's case) that want of power in the bank to purchase the note,
was a bar to recovery, and absolved them (Lazear Brothers-the makers
of the note) from all liability to the bank therefor." Since Lazear Broth-
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It would seem that the rule to be deduced from the con-
sideration of these two cases is: Ultra Vires contracts are
void, and no effect will be given to them save where a bene-
fit moves directly to the party seeking to set up the ultra
vires nature of the transaction or where he was a partici-
pant to it and knowingly procured the benefit for some one
else, in either of which cases the recipient or procurer is
estopped to deny its validity. But in order to show that
Maryland has consistently adhered to a single doctrine in
dealing with the subject of ultra vires contracts, it is ex-
pedient to show that the rule thus derived from a consid-
eration of the distinction between these two cases is equally
explanatory of the conclusions arrived at in all the cases.
So, in the measurement of the conclusion reached, by
the rule submitted, it is found that in the first case69 the
result is expressive of the rule. There was no direct bene-
fit moving to the defendant corporation and accordingly
it was not estopped to set up the defense of ultra vires.
Nor is difficulty to be found in aligning the second case under
the rule for in that case, 70 although the petitioning party
had completed his performance of the contract, yet the
opening of the river beyond the point to which the Steam-
ship Company was empowered by its charter to operate,
was such a benefit as by its nature could not be taken ad-
vantage of, and accordingly the rule requiring a direct
benefit was not satisfied. The conclusion reached in the
next case 71 can also be explained in terms of the rule for
there the plaintiff had received no benefit whatever and
was not estopped to avoid the ultra vires act of the bank.
It is also interesting to note that in this case the Court,
by way of dictum, stated that the trustee "might be
estopped from denyng the legality of the transaction. ....,
Thus, two apparently contradictory statements can be sup-
ported and justified by the application of this single rule.
The result in the next case 73 cannot be explained by the
utilization of the rule, but this is now of no importance
ers were not even parties to the action by the bank, it is difficult to see
how the decision rendered had any effect in determining their liability
to the bank or could absolve them from "all liability". It would seem that
the decision went no further than to return for the consideration of thejury the question of the liability of the guarantor on his contract of
guaranty.
" Steam Nay. Co. v. Dandridge, 8 G. &. J. 248 (1886).
'o Abbott v. Bait. & Rap. Co., 1 Md. Ch. 542 (1850).
11 Albert and wife v. Savings Bank, et al., 2 Md. 159 (1852).
12 Ibid., 172.
73 Maryland Hospital v. Foreman, 29 Md. 524 (1868).
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for it is unquestionably overruled by later cases on the
subject of completely executed contracts. 7 Nor does the
dictum in the next case 75 disprove the rule. The Lazear
case76 has already been discussed, and the following case, 77
by dictum, is further expressive of the rule. After holding
the contract in question to be intra vires, the Court went on
to say that if it were not, the party complaining could have
no redress since he had received the consideration of the
contract. That the rule as stated was the true principle
followed is further shown by the language "There is no
principle upon which a court of equity could be induced to
interfere upon the mere ground of the want of authority
in the adverse party."' The Katz case, 9 having been suf-
ficiently discussed, needs no further elaboration. In Ger-
man Aged People's Home v. Hammerbacker0 there was a
direct benefit received by the defendant's intestate. Al-
though it was held that there was no contravention of policy
in the contract sued upon, the Court expressly stated that
if it were in error in so holding, under the decisions in the
previous cases the defendant would be estopped from set-
ting up the defense of ultra vires. Benefit likewise accrued
to the defendant in the following case81 and it was accord-
ingly held that this factor alone was sufficient to negative
any defense based on the ultra vires character of the trans-
action. After holding a certain transaction not to be ultra
vires in the next case, 8 the Court stated that if it were not,
there was sufficient authority to warrant recovery on the
basis of an estoppel. In the principal case,88 although some
have thought otherwise,84 there is no departure from the
precedents established by the previous cases. For there
no direct benefit moved from the plaintiff to the defendant
corporation. If any benefit did accrue it was indirect, and
moved from persons other than privies to the contract sued
on. The Court, in quoting extensively from the Federal
11 Hagerstown Mfg. Co. v. Keedy, 91 Md. 430, 46 Atl. 96.5 (1900) ; Mon-
trose Bldg. Ass'n. v. Page, 143 Md. 631, 123 Atl. 68 (1923).
71 Bovce v. M. E. Church, 46 Md. 359 (1877).
'I Lazear v. Nat. Union Bank, 52 Md. 78 (1879).
"Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419 (1881).
,8 Ibid., 435.
" United German Bank v. Katz, 57 Md. 128 (1881).
80 German Aged People's Home v. Hammerbacker, 64 Md. 595, 3 Aft.
678 (1886).
9 Heironimus v. Sweeney, 83 Md. 146, 34 Atl. 823 (1896).
" Black v. Bank of Westminster, 96 Md. 399, 54 Atl. 88 (1903).W8 est. Md. R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Co., 102 Md. 307, 62 Atl. 351 (1905).
A, France, Principles of Corporation Law (1914) p. 135; Brune, Mary-
land Corporation Law (1933) Ch. IV, p. 38.
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decisions, cannot be said to have adopted the Federal rule
in all its ramifications. It would appear that the whole ef-
fect of such excerpts is but to further illustrate the first
part of the rule submitted-that an ultra vires contract is
void. Being thus void, with no benefit mo-,ing directly to
the corporation pleading the ultra vires nature of the trans-
action, it was not estopped. This seems the logical inter-
pretation to be placed upon the following language: "The
Hotel Co. has paid nothing, and parted with nothing under
this contract, and is therefore, under all the authorities
without any right of action."85  This interpretation is
strengthened by the fact that the Court expressly stated
that an estoppel would arise in the proper case.8G
To show a consistent adherence to the rule submitted,
it is only necessary to mention briefly two remaining cases.
In Md. Trust Co. v. Mechanics Bank 7 the Court, speaking
of the distinction between ultra vires contracts and illegal
contracts, stated, "a contract simply ultra vires is not neces-
sarily unenforceable-it may be enforced under certain con-
ditions. ,,ss And in a later case,8 the Court, in refusing
to set aside a completely executed contract, which was ultra
vires, stated, "The executed dealings of a corporation must
be allowed to stand for and against both parties, where the
plainest rules of good faith require it."9
Thus, in the Maryland cases, instead of conflict, there is
a striking uniformity of precedents, a century-old adher-
ence to a determinable rule which paradoxically combines
the basic features of both the strict and the liberal views;
and effects a unique but practical end. For it adopts the
strict view in that it declares such contracts void, yet it
tempers this rule in allowing suit on the contract against
the partly directly benefitted. It does not leave the party
performing to an uncertain remedy in quasi-contract, as
does the Federal rule, but, in permitting suit on the con-
tract, grants him all the procedural and substantive ad-
" West. Md. R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Co., 102 Md. 307, 335, 62 Atl. 351 (1905).
Be Ibid., 102 Md. 333. "Parties may be estopped in some cases from dis-
puting the validity of a corporate contract when it has been fullVy per-
formed on one side and when nothing short of enforcement will do justice."
87 Md. Trust Co. v. Mechanics Bank, 102 Md. 608, 63 Atl. 70 (1906).
88 Ibid., 615. Although this comment is not concerned with ultra vires
contracts of municipal corporations, it is worthy of note that in Konig
v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 128 Md. 465, 97 AtI. 837 (1916), an ultra vires
contract of Baltimore City withstood an attack by a taxpayer, when such
contract was fully executed on one side, and the City was apparently
ready to complete its performance.
BI Montrose Bldg. Ass'n. v. Page, 143 Md. 631, 123 Atl. 68 (1923).
"0 Ibid., 635.
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vantages accruing thereto. It guarantees a degree of jus-
tice seldom, if ever, approached in the application of the
harsh and strict Federal rule. It makes for certainty where
otherwise only uncertainty would exist."
ACTION IN MARYLAND FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
CAUSED AND OCCURRING ELSEWHERE-
DAVIS V. RUZICKA'
An action was brought in Maryland by an administra-
trix for the wrongful death of her intestate caused and
occurring in the District of Columbia. The Death Statute
of the District2 enables the personal representative of the
deceased to sue for the benefit of the next of kin and limits
recovery to $10,000. The Maryland Death Statute author-
izes a suit in the name of the State for the benefit of certain
relatives in proportions to be determined by the jury and
with no limit as to the amount of recovery.' This is the
Maryland statute of the Lord Campbell's Act type which
provides compensation to near relatives for the loss of the
benefits calculated to result to them from the continued
living of the deceased. Another Maryland statute4 enables
the personal representative of the deceased to sue for the
benefit of the estate for such injuries and suffering as were
sustained by the deceased in his life time, viz., suffering
between the time of the fatal injury and death. This latter
type of action is not involved in the instant case. The Court
of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the defendant, stating
that suit may be brought in Maryland for a wrongful death
elsewhere only where the statute of the jurisdiction where
the injury and death occurred is similar in its design and
purpose to that of Maryland.
" To bolster the conclusion reached it is interesting to notice the lan-
guage in the case of Heironimus v. Sweeney, 83 Md. 146, 159, 34 Atl. 823
(1896). There the Court, in discussing various views, had this to say,
"Other Courts have held that although the money obtained under ultra
vires contracts must be returned to the party to whom it rightfully be-
longs; yet an action cannot be maintained on the contract itself." The
Court then cites several Supreme Court cases in support of this doctrine,
and then continues, "But whether an action is brought on the contract
or the equitable grounds which show that the plaintiff ought ex aequo et
bono to recover, the object which the law seeks to accomplish is the same."
I - Md. -, 183 Atl. 569 (1936).
District of Columbia Code, Title 21, Secs. 1-3.
'Md. Code and Code Supp., Art. 67, Secs. 1, 2.
'Md. Code Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 106. See also Md. Code Supp., Art. 75,
Sec. 29.
